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Narrative approaches in mental health: preserving the emancipatory tradition  
 
Abstract 
 
Narrative approaches have exercised an emancipatory influence within mental 
health. In this paper it is suggested that there is a risk that the emancipatory tradition 
associated with narrative may be co-opted through contemporary mental health 
strategy by a narrow agenda which promotes a particular western and neoliberal 
form of citizenship. This may limit the way recovery can be imagined by equating it 
solely with the future-orientated individual who strives, above all, to be economically 
independent. To resist this, it is suggested that narrative in mental health should be 
approached with recourse to therapeutic thinking which promotes a relational ethos 
RI µUHFRYHU\ WRJHWKHU¶7KH µUHFRYHU\ WRJHWKHU¶PRGHO LVVXEVHTXHQWO\FRQVLGHUHG LQ
relation to narrative research on temporal understandings which have been 
conducted in disability studies and in the area of chronic illness. These studies point 
towards the value of a relational orientation towards wellbeing in the present, rather 
than fixating on future goals. It is suggested that a relational philosophy of the 
present might be usefully incorporated into narrative approaches when working 
therapeutically with people suffering from mental distress.  It is argued that this might 
enable users and practitioners to extend the available narrative templates and to 
imagine recovery in diverse ways which support personal transformation and, 
ultimately, contribute to social change. 
 
Key words: narrative, mental health, recovery, IAPT, managed care 
  
Introduction 
The key principles defining recovery [from mental distress] were first established in a 
number of seminal papers which shared the view that recovery is principally a social 
rather than a clinical process (see Deegan, 1993; Anthony, 1993; Coleman, 1999, 
Dillon, 2011). For Deegan the main concern was to critique narrow understandings 
of rehabilitation in order to encourage more open understandings of hope. Coleman 
(1998) explicitly argued for a political understanding of recovery, and Dillon (2011) 
emphasised the importance of both individual and collective approaches to recovery 
which challenged oppressive structures. Despite a slightly different emphasis, 
recovery is based on a rejection of the view that the symptoms of mental illness 
GHILQHDSHUVRQ¶V identity.  What is particularly important in relation to this paper is 
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that recovery has the potential to open up diverse stories of hope which may or may 
QRWLQYROYHWKHUHVWLWXWLRQRIµQRUPDOLW\¶ 
 
Given that a major challenge for people with mental health problems has been to 
have their perspective viewed as legitimate, narrative approaches have provided 
opportunities for people suffering from mental distress to gain a previously denied 
authorship of their own biography. Whilst this is a welcome development, it is 
suggested in this paper that there is a risk that the possibilities for envisioning 
recovery in mental health may be limited through the influence of contemporary and 
historical metanarratives which locate success according to an LQGLYLGXDO¶Vperceived 
ability to master future uncertainty. More specifically, the traditional moral quest to 
determine future events, associated with the modern era since the 18th century, is 
increasingly morphing within liberal/neoliberal societies into a preoccupation with an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶V DELOLW\ WR IORXULVK LQ the context of market relations. The assertion that 
approaches to mental health have been colonized by a neoliberal agenda is now well 
rehearsed (for example see Ramon, 2008; Teghtsoonian, 2009; Morrow, 2013; 
Esposito and Perez, 2014; Henderson, 2014). This paper adds to this literature by 
considering how neoliberalism is a continuation and reworking of a narrative of 
identity which emerged with the birth of the modern age. We consider how this 
narrative, which emphasises an individual and linear life trajectory, is currently 
enacted in mental health care strategy. Whilst we draw mainly on the example of the 
UK, this paper is equally of relevance to comparable liberal/neoliberal states, such 
as the USA, Canada, and Australia where mental health care systems have been 
shaped by a similar move towards evidence-based psychological therapies (Shera, 
1996, Teghtsoonian, 2009; Henderson, 2014).  
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Our aim is to alert the reader to the possibility that current approaches to mental 
health care in liberal/neoliberal societies may encourage service users and 
practitioners to think of recovery in normative rather than imaginative and 
empowering terms.  In response we suggest an approach of µUHFRYHU\ WRJHWKHU¶
which dismantles the binary between service users and practitioners, thereby 
offering the potential for the positive transformation of both parties. It is suggested 
WKDW µrecovery together¶ requires a rediscovery of the µVRFLRORJLFDO LPDJLQDWLRQ¶ 
associated with the survivor movement, and an openness which can imagine 
recovery in ways which differ from dominant templates of citizenship. In short, the 
SDSHU ZKLFK UHIOHFWV WKH DXWKRUV¶ respective backgrounds in sociology and 
psychotherapy, seeks to raise awareness about the importance of protecting the 
emancipatory potential of narrative approaches in mental health.  
 
Background 
The ascendancy of the recovery movement within mental health has been 
accompanied by a growing popularity of narrative approaches in research and within 
therapies which, in various ways, have challenged biomedical understandings of 
mental illness whilst illuminating the personal experiences of people suffering from 
mental distress (see for example Grant 2006; Short, et al, 2007; Grant, et al, 2011). 
It is at least partially thanks to these accounts that personal testimonies are being 
increasingly regarded as key within therapeutic interventions (Place et al, 2011). As 
a result, the symptoms associated with different forms of mental distress are viewed 
by some as meaningful responses to environmental and cultural stresses rather than 
as biological dysfunctions (Hornstein, 2013, Johnstone. 2014). Whilst biological 
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definitions of mental illness indisputably persist they have forfeited some of their 
former largely uncontested legitimacy. This is partly attributable to the growing 
popularity of narrative approaches in health care contexts which are characterised by 
the ascendancy of patient-centred care .LQJ¶V)XQG.HRJK  
 
Despite the advances which have been made, the contemporary field of mental 
health in liberal/neoliberal states is being significantly shaped by a policy movement 
towards managed healthcare which has been identified as aligned to the techniques 
associated with neoliberal governance (see Fullagar, 2008; Teghtsoonian, 2009; 
Esposito and Perez, 2014; Henderson, 2014). Neoliberalism emphasises a particular 
form of individualism consistent with a market-based economy (Rose & Miller, 1992; 
Dean, 1999). :LWKLQ WKLVFRQWH[W WKH IRFXV LVRQ µUHFRYHU\ IURP¶VSHFLILFV\PSWRPV
which prevent integration into the market economy, with mental illness framed as a 
problem of the individual whilst the cultural, economic and social dimensions which 
underpin much mental distress are ignored (Ramon, 2008). Implicitly this reduces 
the horizon of possibilities for enacting recovery (Fisher and Freshwater, 2015) whilst 
reinstating professional power. What tends to be overlooked is the notion 
(associated with emancipatory narrative traditions) that recovery is a unique 
experience for each individual which is aided by solidarity and collective resistance 
(Howell and Veronka, 2012: 4).  
 
µ5HFRYHU\IURP¶LVPDQLIHVWLQTXDQWLILDEOHHYLGHQFHEDVHGSUDFWLFHDQG in a publicly 
accountable µmanaged care¶ stream of research and practice (see Henderson, 
2014). Above all, it is characterised by a persistent emphasis on diagnosis and on 
µUHFRYHU\ IURP¶ V\PSWRPV. As Freshwater et al   SXW LW µ«GLDJQRVLV
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XQGHUSLQVHYHU\DVSHFWRIDSDWLHQW¶VWKHUDSHXWLFMRXUQH\DQGVHWVWKHSDUDPHWHUVRI
WKHLUPHQWDOLOOQHVV«VRLQWKLVVHQVHWKHSDWLHQW¶VPHQWDOLOOQHVVWKURXJKGLDJQRVLV
LV OLWHUDOO\ ZULWWHQ LQWR H[LVWHQFH¶ Recovery is principally associated with the 
eradication of symptoms which pose obstacles to the individualistic principles of 
responsibility and self-determination. Success is subsequently measured through 
quantitative method (see Clark et al., 2011).  
 
Managed care systems in mental health which have become associated with 
neoliberalism were first introduced in North America (Shera, 1996). In the UK they 
were introduced into the National Health Service in 2007 (NHS) in the form of the 
Improved Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT). This scheme was driven by 
financial considerations in view of the fact that it addresses the problem that 
µEHWZHHQDQGDERXWKDOIDPLOOLRQH[WUDSHRSOH UHJLVWHUHGIRU ,QFDSDFLW\
%HQHILW ,% «EHFDXVH RI D PHQWDO LOOQHVV WDNLQJ WKH WRWDO WR DERXW  PLOOLRQ¶ 
2¶%ULHQ  ,WVDGRSWLRQE\ WKH1HS was preceded by a report which argued 
WKDWSV\FKRORJLFDOWKHUDS\KDGWKHSRWHQWLDOWRUHGXFHWKHFRVWRI,%µIRUWKRVHXQDEOH
WR ZRUN GXH WR SV\FKRORJLFDO GLVWUHVV¶ (Layard, 2006). Subsequently the then UK 
Coalition Government stated that it would support the scheme financially until at 
least 2015 (NHS, 2012). Driven by a top-down technical rational principle of 
µUHFRYHU\ IURP¶, the intention was primarily to enable service users to resume their 
involvement in the job market for the alleged benefit of society (Layard, 2006).  
Consistent with neoliberal ideology, policy-informed definitions of recovery tend to be 
those which are aligned with economic participation whilst the social conditions, 
which might have contributed to the psychological problems, are neglected. 
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According to the British Association of Counselling and Psychotherapy, IAPT is 
increasingly defining the debates within mental health (BACP, 2014).   
 
There is a risk that the models of recovery which are upheld by managed care 
systems in liberal states may surreptitiously infiltrate understandings which shape 
the landscape of mental health, seeping even into the most emancipatory narrative 
approaches.  It should be pointed out that this will rarely occur as a result of a 
conscious and deliberate strategy. People tend to reproduce social structures and 
dominant cultures mainly through inadvertent actions. As Bhaskar (1989: 80) puts it, 
µ  SHRSOHGRQRWPDUU\WRUHSURGXFHWKHQXFOHDUIDPLO\RUZRUNWRUHSURGXFHWKH
capitalist economy. But it is nevertheless the unintenGHG FRQVHTXHQFH¶ In other 
words, emancipatory agendas can be inadvertently undermined in ways that can go 
largely unnoticed. This is discussed in more detail below in relation to Raymond 
:LOOLDPV¶1977, cited in Gray, 2008: 937) FRQFHSWRIDµVWUXFWXUHRIIHHOLQJ¶    
 
Structure of feeling DQGµUHFRYHU\WRJHWKHU¶ 
7KHWHUPµVWUXFWXUHRIIHHOLQJWilliams 1884, cited in Gray, 2008: 937) was coined to  
refer to the emotional landscape which at a particular time and in a specific location 
shapes the way people apprehend the world. In short, the structure of feeling of any 
given time and place is comprised by the social relations, social organisation, the 
dominant ideas, and the material conditions, and yet it is something more than the 
sum of these dimensions. The structure of feeling shapes SHRSOH¶VUHVSRQVHVWRWKH
world, sometimes at pre-reflexive levels. Within the UK and comparable states, the 
VWUXFWXUHRIIHHOLQJLVVLJQLILFDQWO\FRQVWLWXWHGE\WKHµQXPLQRXVLPDJH¶RIWKHmarket 
economy.  A µQXPLQRXVLPDJH is an image that has captivated people, consciously 
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or pre-reflexively (Samuels, 2001: 142).  Whilst Samuels does not directly address 
how the potency of a numinous image comes about, Foucauldian scholars have 
argued that neoliberal governance is internalised through specific technologies of 
rule which ostensibly avoid coercion but instead encourage individuals to subscribe 
to a particular view of personhood shaped according to market imperatives (Rose & 
Miller, 1992; Dean, 1999, Teghtsoonian, 2009). As Teghtoonian (2009) points out, 
managed care systems within mental health care constitute subtle technologies of 
rule. As such they are likely to have some influence in shaping the development of 
SHRSOH¶V Xnderstandings - service users and providers alike ± in relation to how 
recovery may be envisioned.  
 
To combat the tendency towards the narrowing of narrative horizons which are open 
to diverse understanding of recovery we are in favour of maintaining and reinforcing 
the connection between narrative and psychodynamic, humanistic and integrative 
traditions based on critical reflection, innovation and theory-building (Lees, 2010) in 
order to supplement cognitive behavioural therapy which is the primary therapeutic 
approach in managed care.  This may at first seem a curious strategy in view of the 
aims of this paper.  These traditions have, after all, traded off the western notion of 
the autonomous self, often placing ontological separation at the top of a hierarchy of 
values. Ideas of connectedness have been under assault in western societies since 
the emergence of the modern period in the 18th century and, for the most part, 
psychology has colluded in this.  However, in their more contemporary forms, 
psychodynamic, humanistic and integrative approaches are based on a relational 
and intersubjective model which does not privilege the atomized and individualistic 
self. Relational approaches instead see the field of interaction between the therapist 
and the client as shaped by the inner worlds of both (Mitchell, 1998; Aron, 2014; 
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Orbach, 2014). Ideally, the relationship involves a dyad of exploration and 
imagination which defies the more traditional healing binary of healthy expert and ill 
patient. Perhaps rather than thinking of it in terms of µUHFRYHU\LQ¶, thinking in terms of 
µUHFRYHU\ WRJHWKHU¶ may be more apposite. This potentially offers the space to 
imagine recovery as a process of growth and development, enabling recovery to be 
found in ways that could not be anticipated at the outset. Crucially, it involves a 
democratic relationship between service users and practitioners. The benefits of self-
transformation do not accrue solely at the level of the personal or the interpersonal. 
/RFNHGXSLQSHRSOH¶VQDUUDWLYHVRIWKHLUH[SHULHQFHs in the world are critiques of that 
world, and the development of psychologically informed and innovative self-
transformation coexists with political and social awareness (Taylor, 1989; Samuels, 
2001; Crossley and Crossley, 2001 Fisher and Freshwater, 2015).   
 
This is not to assert that paid employment is not, or should not be, important to many 
people with mental health problems. People on the margins would undoubtedly often 
benefit from greater financial and economic resources, but narrative approaches in 
mental health should, we believe, facilitate and unleash aspirations and energy 
which extend beyond the imperatives of economic participation. This is only likely to 
be achievable if narrative horizons are not inadvertently circumscribed by a 
hegemonic understanding of what constitutes successful personhood.    
 
A sociological imagination 
:KLOVWWKHLGHDRIUHPDLQLQJµRSHQ¶ may seem like an easy appeal to make, after all 
few ZRXOGDGYRFDWHEHLQJµFORVHG¶ZHZDQWWRHPSKDVLVe here is that it is extremely 
difficult to do so. Crucially, we suggest that maintaining openness involves, among 
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other things, being open to dialogue and a readiness to evaluate critically the 
prevailing common sense DV ZHOO DV RQH¶V RZQ SHUVRQDO DVVXPSWLRQV. In other 
words, it requires, among other things, a µsociological imagination¶ (Mills, 1959). It 
was after all a sociological imagination which gave rise to the survivor movement in 
mental health, a political awakening in the field of mental health which is described 
by Crossley and Crossley (2001) in a paper which provides a poststructural analysis 
of two studies of narrative testimonies of mental health patients. The first entitled The 
Plea for the Silent and Speaking our Minds dates back to the 1950s. This study is 
atypical of its time in the sense that it provides patients in mental hospitals with an 
RSSRUWXQLW\WRµVSHDNRXW¶DERXWWKHLUH[SHULHQFHV1HYHUWKHOHVVWKH testimonies are 
entirely typical of their time in the sense that they are essentially stories of 
individualized suffering which tell of lives lost, opportunities missed and the absence 
of hope for future progression. In contrast, in the second study Speaking our Minds 
which was published in the 1990s, service user (no longer patient) narratives point to 
a strong sense of survivor identity which has developed as a result of a collective 
response to institutional oppression. In other words, the personal suffering 
characteristic of mental distress in the 1950s had been reconfigured as a political 
issue within narratives which establishes the link between internal mental and 
exterior social conditions. What the two studies powerfully demonstrate is that whilst 
DSHUVRQ¶Vsense of self can be undone by injustice and isolation, it can be repaired 
through solidarity with others,  and that solidarity can be established through shared 
narratives which lead to unanticipated forms of individual and collective forms of 
empowerment.  We suggest that the importance of solidarity and of openness to 
understandings of recovery may be overlooked within the mental health strategy 
underpinning IAPT. In stating this, we recognise that the aetiology of mental health 
12 
 
problems is in many cases likely to defy any simplistic separation of social and 
personal factors. However, the current focus on IAPT does not necessarily provide 
the space to enable new ways of thinking to emerge through a process of critical 
HYDOXDWLRQ WKDW FRPHV WKURXJK DQ DWWHQWLYH HQJDJHPHQW WR RWKHUV¶ SHUVSHFWLYHV 
(Taylor, 1989). Instead it tends to reinstate professional power and place the 
obligation on the service user to comply with the advice they are given in order to 
recover (see Clark et al, 2011).  
 
We identify a risk here that managed care systems in general, and IAPT in particular, 
may reinforce a structure of feeling, which emerged in the modern period, but which 
persists in a reworked version in western cultures saturated by the neoliberal 
agenda. Whilst the trope of linear time significantly predates the advent of 
neoliberalism, it has assumed a particularly limiting guise within neoliberal discourse 
in which progress and success segue with the ability to flourish financially. In the 
discussion below, we consider linear time in relation to western personhood, and, 
and subsequently discuss how this narrative, in its current neoliberal form, is 
embedded in mental health policy.   
 
The future-orientated individual  
The starting point for narrative approaches tends to be that good mental health is 
associated with the ability to tell a coherent life story. Recovery is frequently equated 
with the ability to develop a revised sense of self through a biographical re-write 
which provides meaning within and through the illness experience. As Roe and 
Davidson (2006) explain, narrative is a tool which people use to weave back together 
a sense of self, which is based on and yet extends beyond who they were before 
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they were ill. In other words, story-telling enables people to attribute meaning to their 
lives which supports the development of a positive sense of self. As Kearney (2002: 
152) says, 
Storytelling invites us to become not just agents of our own lives, but  
narrators and readers as well. It shows us that the untold life is not worth  
living. There will always be someone WKHUHWRVD\³WHOOPHDVWRU\´DQG 
 someone there to respond. Were this not so, we would no longer be fully 
 human. (p. 156) 
 
Being fully human is thus equated with the ability to link past actions with 
experiences in the present, and equally anticipate how present actions will be lived 
out in the future. This linear understanding of time and of life trajectories is related to 
the Enlightenment project and the emergence of modernism at the end of the 
eighteenth century (Ezzy, 2000). Since then understandings of temporality as a 
linear process have become central to narrative constructions of identity in western 
societies.  From a sociological perspective, Elias (1992) argued that the introduction 
of clocks and calendars led to forms of self-regulation which prompted the 
development of moral concepts of individual responsibility which encouraged people 
to take control of time by utilising it as productively as possible. Actions in the 
SUHVHQWFDPHWREHDVVHVVHGµLQWHUPVRIWKHHIILFLHQF\RIPHDQVLQDFKLHYLQJHQGV¶
6LHJHO   DQG SURJUHVV ZDV WR EH DFKLHYHG E\ µUXJJHG LQGLYLGXDOV¶ ZKR
sought certainty and strove to become architects of their own futures (Dudley-
Marling 2004: 489). This has resulted in an orientation whereby behaviour and 
actions in the present tend to be evaluated according to their impact in shaping 
future events.  
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This position is reflected in influential (western) philosophical thinking. In Sources of 
the Self the philosopher Charles Taylor (1989) argues that the ability to see oneself 
as an unfolding story is bound up with the development of moral identities. To have 
no moral framework enabling a person to orient herself to the good is, for Taylor, 
tantamount to having no sense of self. Since there is no sense of self without an 
orientation to the good, and since our place relative to the good is something that 
changes over time, our sense of the good has to be incorporated into an 
understanding of our lives DVDQXQIROGLQJVWRU\$V7D\ORU SXWV LW µ7KH
LVVXHIRUXVKDVWREHQRWRQO\ZKHUHZHDUHEXWZKHUHZH¶UHJRLQJ¶The view  that 
the good life is always future-orientated has been contended by Strawson (2004) 
who takes issues with the view that a narrative of linear progression is essential to a 
moral life and to a well lived life.  
 
The protagonist within linear narratives is under a moral obligation to steer their life 
trajectory down a positive course towards the future. Similarly, practitioners and 
researchers engaging in narrative approaches may assume that recovery involves 
biographical reconstruction, with the person with a mental illness learning to 
UHFRQILJXUH WKHPVHOYHV DV µWKH SURWDJRQLVW WKH KHUR RI KHU RZQ VWRU\¶ 5RH DQG
Davidson 2006: 91-92). Whilst helpful to some service users, this may be disabling 
for many others, particularly if aspiration is defined narrowly according to a person¶s 
ability to flourish within market conditions. As Bourdieu (1984) noted (in relation to 
unemployed people) the internalisation of dominant notions of commodified linear 
time can have profoundly damaging effects on individuals.  
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Within this discourse the market itself is imbued with certain moral qualities. In 
relation to this, it is worth noting that whilst mental health policy discourse in the UK 
acknowledges the material and environmental conditions which can adversely 
impact on mental health, this is invariably accompanied by a strong discourse of 
responsibilisation which identifies mental health problems as a fiscal burden. The 
individual citizen is identified as primarily responsible for his or her economic 
autonomy. In No health without mental health UHFRYHU\ LVGHVFULEHGDV µFHQWUDO WR
our economic success and interdependent with our success in improving education, 
WUDLQLQJ DQG HPSOR\PHQW RXWFRPHV«¶ '+  ±3). In Closing the Gap (DH, 
2014:4) the link between mental health and economic self-sufficiency is expressed in 
the introduction,  
All too often, for example, poor mental health precipitates premature job loss. 
This is a waste for individuals and for the economy. In addition, we know that 
not having a job is too often associated with the onset or recurrence of mental 
health problems and being out of or away from work can sustain the 
symptoms of mental ill health.  
 
Although health policy discourse is embedded in the LGHD RI WKH µ%LJ 6RFLHW\¶ WKH
Department of Health is arguably promoting a narrative which assumes that recovery 
is manifest when people are assimilated into market relations. The discourse 
underpinning UK mental health policy is reflected in comparable liberal/neoliberal 
states. In Healthy Minds and Healthy People, a policy document produced by the 
Ministry of Health Services and Ministry of Children and Family Development (2010) 
in British Columbia, the fiscal burden of mental health is addressed on the first page. 
2QH RI WKH NH\ DLPV LV LGHQWLILHG DV µpromoting the healthy social and emotional 
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development of British Columbians in order to maximize their investments and yield 
long-term positive outcomes and economic gains for individuals, businesses and 
government¶S.  
 
 Whilst assuming paid employment is clearly a desirable object for many, questions 
need to be asked about the consequences for mental health users who are unable to 
conform to this model of citizenship. The most acute form of social suffering can 
occur when those on the margins internalise denigrating narratives which undermine 
KRSH DQG D SRVLWLYH VHQVH RI VHOI 6XIIHULQJ LV LQWHUQDOLVHG LQWR DSHUVRQ¶V LGHQWLW\
and the resultant sense of abjection leads to a lack of agency (Bourdieu, 1984) 
 
In the discussion which follows we draw on narrative studies taken from the field of 
chronic illness and disability studies which offer an alternative temporal and 
relational understanding µWKH SKLORVRSK\ RI WKH SUHVHQW¶ (]]\ ; Fisher and 
Goodley, 2007) which directs attention to alternative transformative possibilities. In 
contrast to the linear narrative of progress, the philosophy of the present appears to 
be aligned with a relational rather than ontological separate understanding of the 
self.   
 
 
Another perspective in narrative studies of disability and chronic illness 
Apart from the occasional exception (see Beresford, 2002) there has been a general 
reluctance to engage in ongoing dialogue between survivor activists and 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV RI WKH GLVDEOHG SHRSOH¶V PRYHPHQW LQ RUGHU WR GHYHORS D µVRFLDO
model of madness and distress¶. However recently there has been as a small body 
of scholarship (see Howell and Veronka, 2012) which has opened up new ways of 
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thinking through the connections between social justice and mental health, precisely 
by challenging the norms that underpin the very value of µmental health¶ or µmental 
illness¶ as useful categories or ways of thinking about people. This scholarship takes 
inspiration from the mad movement (Morrison, 2005; Fabris, 2011), which is 
exploring the positive valuing of madness as a form of difference. This literature 
resonates with critical disability studies which reject the biomedical interpretations of 
disability.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to articulate an argument which develops 
significant links between mental health and critical disability and/or chronic illness. 
Nevertheless, we draw on specifically narrative studies taken from the field of critical 
disability studies (Fisher and Goodley, 2007; Gibson et al., 2009) and narrative 
studies of chronic illness, specifically HIV (Davies, 1997; Ezzy, 2000). These studies 
are discussed because they demonstrate that individuals are sometimes able to 
resist the hegemony of the dominant time culture.          
 
In a study relating to parents with disabled babies, Fisher and Goodley (2007), 
observed that parents who broadly subscribed to a linear narrative, premised on an 
understanding of selfhood as ontologically separate, were most likely to view 
disability essentially as a personal tragedy. Interpreting disability as a personal 
trouble, the parents identified medical expertise as offering the best hope for their 
child to achieve greater normality in the future. The realisation that the desired 
outcome was unobtainable led, for some parents, to a sense of hopelessness and 
self-imposed isolation.  This finding resonates with an earlier study on people living 
with HIV by Davies (1997) who describes some people as living in an µHPSW\
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SUHVHQW¶FKDUDFWHULVHGE\DODFNRIKRSHDQGPHDQLQJ6LPLODUO\*LEVRQKDV
noted that young men living with the life-limiting condition Duchenne often resorted 
to aggressive and anti-social behaviour in dealing with the uncertainty of the future in 
a cultural context which emphasised the importance of linear progression over 
present wellbeing. Failure to meet normative milestones, Gibson et al. (2009) argue, 
can create a sense of failure and entrench marginalization among disabled people 
who do not progress according to hegemonic notions of linear time. 
 
Related to the linear narrative but in a slightly different guise, Fisher and Goodley 
(2007) identified a narrative of challenge which was more critical of the medical 
model of disability and generally less deferential towards medical expertise. That 
said, in common with the linear narrative, meaningfulness within the narrative of 
challenge was achieved by moving towards future goals or a telos (MacIntyre 2007: 
202), with parents on a journey of equipping themselves WRµILJKW¶IRUWKHLUFKLOGUHQ¶V
future wellbeing. Whilst this approach brought its own rewards, particularly when it 
FDPH WR DFFHVVLQJ PDWHULDO DQG UHVRXUFHV WKH RQJRLQJ µILJKW¶ ZDV H[KDXVWLQJ IRU
many.  These parents tended to remain wedded to the idea that future wellbeing was 
more or less contingent on the ability to overcome the obstacles associated with 
disability. Whilst often heroic, this could be limiting. As Walker (1998: 127) has 
argued from a feminist perspective on stories premised on integrative coherence, 
I picture tired stories being dutifully tended and maintained because they are 
integral to an existing plot. I picture something especially onerous for those 
who feel that others have had a disproportionate hand in writing stories for 
them that are limiting, cruel, oppressive, or alienating to some things they 
sense but do not (yet) have stories available to express.  
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7KHSUREOHPZLWKSODFLQJRQH¶VKRSHLQDSDUWLFXODUIXWXUH-based outcome is that it is 
often highly precarious. Ontological security is related to an understanding that there 
is one good way of leading a life (Ezzy, 2000), a view which, as argued above, tends 
to be reflected in current mental health strategy.  
 
In contrast, however, to the linear narrative, Ezzy (2000) identified a different 
temporal understanding among some of his interviewees who had been diagnosed 
with HIV. This was a temporal orientation which appeared to enable people to enjoy 
the present for what it is by investing future uncertainty with hopefulness. Rather 
than being focused on a particular outcome, hope ZDV µcontinually open to the 
SRVVLELOLW\ WKDW UHDOLW\ ZLOO GLVFORVH DV \HW XQNQRZQ VRXUFHV RIPHDQLQJ DQG YDOXH¶
(Barnard 1995: 48, cited in Ezzy 2000: 607). Similarly, Davies (1997), in a study 
which addresses the existential problems faced by people living with HIV, noted that 
in a curious way some participants sensed that their diagnosis liberated them from 
the need to fight for the future, giving them permission to build a meaningful life in 
the present. Again in )LVKHU DQG *RRGOH\¶V (2007) study on parents with disabled 
EDELHVVRPHRIWKHLQWHUYLHZHHVDSSHDUHGWRHQJDJHLQDµSKLORVRSK\RIWKHSUHVHQW¶ 
based on the valuing of relationships with their children and with others, particularly 
other parents who had a disabled child. This focus on present often involved a 
distancing (although not rejection) of materialist values (Davies, 1997; Fisher and 
Goodley, 2007), and a collective move towards a political challenge to deficit-based 
understandings of disability (Fisher and Goodley, 2007; Fisher, 2008). This appears 
to be aligned to 'LSURVH¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµFRUSRUHDOJHQHURVLW\¶DVDW\SHRI
embodied and relational generosity based on openness to alterity. Corporeal 
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generosity not only encourages people to be open to others - but sees this very 
openness as a constituent of identity.  The subject on the linear life trajectory 
towards individual success is substituted for one who is other-UHODWHG7RXVH)UDQN¶V
SWHUPWKHµG\DGLF¶VXEMHFWLVFUHDWHGZKRUHFRJQLVHVWKDWµHYHQWKRXJK
the other is a body outside of PLQH«this other has to do with me, as I with WKHP¶¶
(original emphasis). Far from closing down agency, this view of the relational located 
within an open future appeared to encourage people to see themselves as active 
and evolving. If anything, agency was promoted by at least partially by overcoming 
the fear of an uncertain future.   
 
Acceptance that the future is not entirely controllable DSSHDU WR RSHQ SHRSOH¶V
horizons regarding what is possible (Ezzy, 2000, Fisher and Goodley, 2007), a 
perspective that is often rejected by health and social care professionals (Fisher and 
Goodley, 2007; Fisher, 2008). In response some of the parents of disabled babies 
sought out alternative spaces in their homes and local communities, and via social 
media, in which they were able to collectively develop counter-narratives which 
challenged neo-liberal understandings of citizenship by emphasising the 
transformative aspect of relational and collective identities (Fisher and Fisher, 2007).  
Some practitioners, KRZHYHU FRQWLQXHG WR DVVHUW WKDW SDUHQWV KDG QRW µWDNHQ RQ
ERDUG UHDOLW\¶, a position which can be interpreted as a form of parsimony which 
dismisses alternative ways of envisioning human flourishing (Diprose, 2002). 
Similarly, we suggest in this paper that narrative approaches in mental health should 
not be foreclosed by unquestioned acceptance of dominant narratives of personhood 
and citizenship. 
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Recovery together and co-production 
The relational orientation to the present discussed above resonates, we suggest, 
ZLWKSV\FKRORJLFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIµUHFRYHU\WRJHWKHU¶. From this perspective, the 
goal is no longer solely WRµFXUH¶WKHµSDWLHQW¶EXWWRHQJDJHLQDSURFHVVZKLFKPD\
lead to mutual transformation. This said, we do not wish to set up a new binary 
between temporal orientations towards the present and the future, but we suggest 
that an engagement with the present which is relational and based on an openness 
to alterity can be a source of wellbeing whilst providing the space for emancipatory 
and transformational possibilities ± a point which is well-expressed in Daniel Stern¶V 
(2004) notion of the moment as an experience of kairos: 
 
Kairos is the passing moment in which something happens as the time 
unfolds. It is the coming into being of a new state of things, and it happens in 
a moment of awareness. It has its own boundaries and escapes or transcends 
the passage of linear time. Yet it also contains a past. It is a subjective 
parenthesis set off from chronos. Kairos is a moment of opportunity, when 
events demand action or are propitious for action. (Stern, 2004: 7) 
 
The transformational and emancipatory possibilities of such a moment of meeting 
are connected to the fact that they exist both beyond time but are also connected to 
the passage of time.  Such an event µKDV LWV RZQ ERXQGDULHV DQG HVFDSHV RU
WUDQVFHQGVWKHSDVVDJHRIOLQHDUWLPH¶DQG\HWLVµLQVRPHNLQGRIGLDORJLFHTXLOLEULXP
ZLWK WKH SDVW DQG IXWXUH¶ 6WHUQ : 28). It is both a personal and a political 
experience which can EHJLQ ZLWKLQ D WKHUDSHXWLF HQFRXQWHU EDVHG RQ µUHFRYHU\
WRJHWKHU¶.    
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Whilst it is clearly unrealistic to imagine that each therapeutic encounter is likely to 
UHVXOW LQ D PRPHQW¶V HSLSKDQ\ recovery together might be viewed as at least 
creating the potential for this to occur. We have previously questioned 7D\ORU¶V
(1989) view that the moral life is necessarily future-orientated, nevertheless, we 
remain persuaded by his perspective, developed in the Sources of the Self, that 
each person has a distinct and authentic way of being human. On this basis, Taylor 
(1989) argues that everybody should have the opportunity to grow towards their best 
self rather than being obliged to follow an externally imposed blueprint. We suggest 
WKDWWKLVLVDYLHZZKLFKFRXOGXVHIXOO\IRUPµUHFRYHU\WRJHWKHU¶ by replacing the focus 
on the pathology of the service user to one which opens up a conversation which 
potentially provides the space for the growth and development of service user and 
practitioner alike.  
 
Such an approach would require the notion of ontological separation to yield to a 
view of the self as relational and embedded, who achieves autonomy within 
relationships of interdependency, as reflected in narratives of the parents with 
disabled babies and people diagnosed with HIV discussed above (Fisher and 
Goodley, 2007; Ezzy, 2000). Similar strategies are reflected in some community 
mental health groups which work on collectively developing mutual support, often in 
innovative ways. Here, the focus is often on activities which develop relational 
wellbeing in the present through engaging in social and creative activities (Alderdice 
and Fisher, 2015).  It is perhaps worth pointing out that the philosophy of the present 
is always relational and other-orientated, a key point which distinguishes it from the 
pursuit of immediate and often self-centred gratification associated with 
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consumerism. The ability to flourish meaningfully in the present requires 
attentiveness, responsiveness and openness to others (Ezzy, 2000, Fisher and 
Goodley, 2007), an ethos which is often less well supported in managed health care 
systems. Paradoxically, though, there are policy initiatives which potentially 
encouragHµUHFRYHU\WRJHWKHU¶ZKLOVWSRVVLEO\RSHQLQJWKHVSDFHIRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJV
of recovery which may incorporate the philosophy of the present. This is discussed 
below in relation to contemporary policy shift towards co-production in mental health. 
 
Co-production, currently an important policy objective in mental health in the UK 
(NHS England 2013, CQC 2014, DH 2014a), involves working across organisational 
boundaries, (that is between third sector, community and public and statutory 
organisations,) and through genuine partnerships with service users. Admittedly a 
key limitation of the term co-production is that it can be easily co-opted to mean quite 
different approaches, and it lends itself to being adopted as an adroit tactic which 
enables µlip service¶ to be paid to patient involvement whilst maintaining normative 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJVRI µUHFRYHU\ IURP¶DSSURDFKHV However, at its most transformatory 
(see Needham and Carr, 2008), co-production entails the development of equal 
partnerships between service users and practitioners in therapeutic encounters and, 
equally, in shaping mental health practice, management, governance, 
commissioning and policy. In other words, co-production and, we suggest, µUHFRYHU\
together¶ are ultimately concerned with authentic power-sharing which can enable 
personal transformation and shape practices and services in mental health ± thereby 
ultimately contributing to social transformation (Needham and Carr, 2009).Co-
SURGXFWLRQPD\SRWHQWLDOO\RIIHUDZD\IRUZDUGIRUµUHFRYHU\WRJHWKHU¶DSSURDFKHV       
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Discussion  
Whilst narrative approaches are often seen as investing people with mental health 
problems with epistemic authority, this paper attempts to alert readers to the risk that 
dominant narrative templates may insidiously weave their way into SHRSOH¶V 
lifeworlds where they furtively close down our ability to imagine diverse 
understandings of recovery and alternative ways of being. We are the most 
SHUVXDGHGE\ WKH µUHFRYHU\ WRJHWKHU¶ PRGHO ZKLFK DYRLGV setting up false binaries 
between service users and professionals which pathologise the former and invest 
power in the latter. We see µUHFRYHU\IURP¶as potentially consistent with the current 
policy focus on co-production. Equally, we alert the reader to the fact that stories of 
survivorship emphasise relational approaches ZKLFKDUHUHVSHFWIXORIVHUYLFHXVHUV¶
frames of reference and, crucially, do not foreclose narrative horizons (see Grant et 
al, 2011). The extract below is a particularly telling plea in this respect, which 
underlines how therapeutic relationships should seek to open up new freedoms: 
:KHQ\RXZRUNZLWKSHRSOHWUHDWSHRSOHZLWKUHJDUGDQGUHVSHFW«%HUHDO
%HKXPDQDQG\RXPLJKW MXVWFRQQHFWZLWK µXV¶«<RXZLOOKDYHXVHG\RXU
skills but more importantly you will have allowed yourself in your scientific 
world to access your humanity and through empathy you can give hope to 
others and a freedom in life ± a freedom of mind for which we all strive (Jamie 
James, 2011 in Grant et al., 2011: 143-144)  
 
Practitioners who apply narrative approaches need to be mindful that their own 
perspectives are not limited by tropes of linearity which reflect and reinforce a 
political agenda of individualism based on narrow economic autonomy.  This is not to 
downplay the importance of economic autonomy, but we take the view that the 
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process of recovery should at least support the potential for moments of epiphany 
when people create something new or unanticipated. This may be prompted 
precisely as a consequence of resistance to the norms which reinforce 
marginalization (Ezzy, 2000, Fisher and Goodley, 2007).  Whilst this may involve a 
rejection of linearity in favour of a philosophy of the present, it may be something 
entirely different from this. As Deleuze & Guattari (1988, p. 216 cited in Tamboukou 
2008, p. 288) argue, there can be moment when something flows or breaks free, and 
a new unanticipated perspective emerges. This experience is particularly associated 
with subordinated groups such as women, youth and µthe mad¶. This is, for example, 
how hearing voices came to be seen by some as a sign of sensitivity or an attempt at 
meaning-making rather than as a symptom of biological dysfunction.  
 
Hendry (2007) goes so far as to argue that OLVWHQLQJWRSHRSOH¶VQDUUDWLYHVVKRXOGQRW 
be directed towards a search for QDUUDWLYHFRKHUHQFHZKLFKFDQIRUHFORVHSHRSOH¶V
identities. Instead the focus should be on non-judgement and on an open horizon of 
possibilities. Put differently, narrative approaches, if approached with a mindset 
which has managed to remain relatively unfettered by  narrow political agendas, offer 
the opportunity to see, as Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 40) would have it, the 
µXQWKRXJKW FDWHJRULHV RI WKRXJKW ZKLFK GHOLPLW WKH WKLQNDEOH DQG predetermine the 
WKRXJKW¶.  
 
Conclusion  
In this paper we have argued that although narrative approaches within mental 
health have emancipatory potential, there is a risk that narrative templates may be 
narrowing. This is at least partly attributable to normative understandings of 
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citizenship within neoliberalism which appear to be supported by the growing 
ascendancy of IAPT. For this reason, we have suggested that narrative approaches 
should remain connected to psychodynamic, humanistic and integrative traditions, 
SDUWLFXODUO\ WKRVH EDVHG RQ D µUHFRYHU\ WRJHWKHU¶ PRGHO which appreciates the 
personal and the political :H KDYH FRQVLGHUHG WKH µUHFRYHU\ WRJHWKHU¶ PRGHO in 
relation to a relational focus on present wellbeing. Finally, we have argued that 
narrative approaches should be seen as potentially opening up possibilities for 
unanticipated and innovative forms of recovery which may lead to personal and 
social transformation. Personal awareness and development is linked to 
emancipatory social change which arises when dissonance between mental and 
VRFLDOVWUXFWXUHVSURPSWVDTXHVWLRQLQJRIµQDWXUDO¶DQGFRPPRQVHQVHH[SHFWDWLRQV
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). In brief, rather than allowing narrative to be co-
opted by a neoliberal political agenda, there is a need to build on the  collective and 
transformative legacy of the survivor movement and to extend its achievements by 
creating therapeutic contexts in which people in mental distress may  imagine their 
recovery ways not yet anticipated.  
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